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Abstract 
In this paper we argue that the search for opportunism in government budgets is weakened by the 
absence of a strong reason for why such expenditures should be restricted solely to the period leading 
into the next election. Here we argue that the need to fulfill a set of election platform promises in 
combination with the characteristic that some budget items better attract the attention of voters (with 
deteriorating memories) will lead to a predictable reallocation of budgetary spending across the life of a 
government. Our test for a predictable pattern rather than a specific period of election motivated 
spending uses capital expenditures as our example of more politically visible budgetary items and a data 
set of 14 Indian states over 54 years (1959/60 – 2012/13). The results of the hypotheses that capital 
expenditures as a ratio of both total government expenditure and government consumption alone should 
rise across the entire governing interval are found to be consistent with this hypothesis and provide a fit 
with the data that is marginally better than more traditional models that use either all pre-election periods 
or only the pre-election year of scheduled elections to test for opportunism. The absence of a similar 
interval effect on aggregate state expenditures and on the net budgetary position suggests that evidence 
of political interaction with the budget is more likely to be found in its composition rather than in its 
overall level or in the size of its surplus or deficit. 
JEL Code:  H5, H72, O53, C23. 
Key Words: Political business or budget cycle, the spending composition of Indian States, visibility of 
capital expenditures, panel data, ARDL modeling 
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Economists are increasingly coming to understand…how the performance of a market 
economy depends upon, among other things, the stock of knowledge possessed by 
participants concerning such items as product prices and wage rates.  Analogously, it 
would seem reasonable that the performance of the public economy would depend upon 
the stock of knowledge possessed by voters. (Richard Wagner, 1976) 
 
I. Introduction 
 
While differences in information costs have been used by writers such as Wagner to motivate concepts 
like fiscal illusion and the political business cycle, in this paper we use knowledge differences across 
voters to produce a different type of election cycle. In our case incumbent politicians use differences in 
the degree of visibility across different types of government outputs together with voters’ less than 
perfect memory to change the timing of expenditures over the governing cycle to maximize support. In 
doing so we do not argue that this incentive to win electoral support based on information differences 
necessarily produces excessive government size or a budget cycle that is biased towards deficits 
(although that could easily happen), but rather that a predictable pattern of spending will arise over the 
term of the governing cycle that results in an election cycle within the government’s overall budget.     
 
The idea that an incumbent political party will seek to manipulate policy to achieve electoral advantage 
is so intuitive that the presumption of a political business cycle seems entirely natural. Yet despite this, 
theoretical and empirical support has been hard to come by, at least at the aggregate level. On the 
conceptual side, many have questioned the assumption underlying the original Nordhaus (1975) article 
that voters have myopic expectations, noting that under rational expectations the ability to predictably 
fool voters disappears. A rational for a political budget cycle has been re-established, but now based on 
signalling rather than opportunism (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988). On the empirical side, evidence consistent 
with the use of opportunism either in the form of economic outcomes or underlying fiscal policies has 
also been hard to find (McCallum, 1978). The consensus view, as summarized in Drazen (2001), is that 
evidence of a link between aggregate spending and fiscal deficits with the election cycle is broadly 
lacking. Shi and Svensson (2006) note however that when developing economies are separated from all 
other economies evidence consistent with a political budget cycle does emerge. This finding is also 
present in the work of Brender and Drazen (2005) who attribute the cycle to information obstacles in 
newer democracies that lack electoral experience and/or quality institutions to monitor government 
performance. 
 
In the case of India’s state governments, the particular focus of our inquiry, the lack of electoral 
experience and/or a shortage of electoral awareness and political involvement has not been a concern.1 
Perhaps for this reason, evidence for the existence of a political business cycle has been particularly 
lacking. While arguing that many dimensions of political influence do matter for the choice of 
government policies, neither Khemani (2004, p. 128) nor Dash and Raja (2013, p.305-6) find any 
evidence suggesting that aggregate state expenditures or budget deficits have increased in the year of 
an election. Similarly, Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2006) find “contrary to the predictions of Rogoff and 
Sibert (1988), there is no election year increase in public spending” (p.650). At the federal level, Sen and 
Vaidya (1996) find no evidence of an election cycle in output or consumer price index (CPI), a measure of 
inflation, but do find that some budget items and the overall budget deficit do respond to elections. 
 
                                                          
1 See Khemani (2004) for evidence of widespread voter registration and participation in Indian state elections.  
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The difficulty of finding an election cycle at the level of aggregate expenditure has led to the search for 
evidence of opportunism or targeted interest group spending within the subcomponents of aggregate 
spending, particularly those items that are highly visible such as road or other forms of infrastructure 
construction. Khemani (2004) highlights the case of road construction in Indian states and finds evidence 
that small manipulations in investment and taxation do take place to benefit narrow interest groups. 
Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) and Gonzales (2002) find a similar electoral pattern of response in 
infrastructure and construction spending in Canada and Mexico, respectively. Even within the 
subcategory of capital construction differences can be found. In Columbia, Drazen and Eslava (2010) find 
specific budget items like water and energy infrastructure and housing projects provide evidence of pre-
election spending increases. Alternatively, Potrakfe (2010) finds evidence of electoral response in the 
visibility of health expenditures. Klomp and de Haan (2013) find electoral response in agricultural 
support, while Besley and Burgess (2002) in their study of government responsiveness in the Indian 
states find that it is flood relief, rather than agricultural support, that is particularly responsive to 
elections. Again for the Indian states, Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2006) find that a number of specific 
budget items such as capital account education expenditures are as much as fifteen percent higher in 
scheduled election years. 
 
While examples such as these have established empirically the feature that certain components of the 
government budget can exhibit an election cycle, our contribution to this literature is to focus 
specifically on the question of why budget expenditures designed either to manipulate voters or target 
specific interest groups take place at the end of the governing cycle rather than being spread more 
uniformly throughout the governing interval. To answer this question we use the feature that some 
budget items are inherently more visible to voters and then follow Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), 
Schuknecht (2000), and Keefer and Knack (2002) in focusing on capital expenditures as the budget item 
with greater voter visibility and/or better targeting potential. However attracting better voter attention 
and/or having greater targeting potential does not explain why spending on these items must be 
concentrated at election time. That is, a road to my door should win my vote whether it is delivered at 
the beginning or the end of a governing cycle. Hence to explain why spending later in the term has more 
electoral impact, we assume that voters’ memories for specifics deteriorate over time, perhaps captured 
best in the expression “what have you done for me lately?” These two features then combine to explain 
how a cycle can arise in the composition of the government’s budget rather than its aggregate size (see 
also Herzog and Haslanger (2014)). In essence the story that we model below takes the following form. 
Each political party offers to the electorate a program of policies and outputs designed to win support 
from the median voter. By comparing alternative party platforms and, for the incumbent, comparing 
realizations to previous promises, voters elect a particular party. Even though the winning party wishing 
re-election is constrained by the promises made in the previous election campaign, the party is still free 
to alter the timing of its delivery to achieve maximum political advantage. This we argue produces a 
cycle whereby politically visible (capital) expenditures are raised towards the end of the electoral cycle 
relative to the beginning. Although we place less emphasis on it, similar reasoning could be used to 
explain the existence of a deficit cycle in which the early years of a governing term are devoted to 
accumulating surpluses that can be spent with greater electoral impact in the period leading into the 
next election.2 
 
                                                          
2 Should voters be particularly sensitive to the existence of deficits and accumulating debt, deficits could be run 
early in the governing tenure to allow credit for pre-election surpluses while still achieving overall spending 
promises (see, for example, Pelzman (1992)).     
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The paper proceeds with a formalization of this reasoning. In Section II we present a model of an 
election cycle in capital expenditure that allows for the possibility that the budget cycle could become a 
business cycle. The emphasis is on the factors needed to produce a cycle in the composition of 
government spending. Section III discusses the data and variables used in the paper. This is followed by 
an empirical section that tests the prediction of a cycle in the capital component of Indian state budgets 
over the 1959 and 2012 time period. The analysis uses an error correction process across fourteen 
states to find the pattern of capital spending an established characteristic of the long run. The same 
model is then used to assess whether an election cycle can be found either in aggregate state 
expenditures or in the pattern of changes in state budget surpluses and deficits. The final section 
presents our conclusions. 
 
II. A Political Budget Cycle Model of the Composition of Government Spending 
 
We begin by building a model where changes in government spending can have real effects as the 
foundation of a political budget cycle. Using c(t), m(t), y(t), g1(t), g2(t) and p(t) to represent household 
consumption, the money supply, two types of government spending, real output, and the price level all 
at time t, we posit a Lucas-type of private production economy with a government sector that sets the 
levels of two types of government spending. Here the central bank is assumed to be independent and 
sets the money supply separate from fiscal considerations. Such an economy can be described as one 
where: 
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)� +  𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡),       (1) 
𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) −  𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) −  𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡) =  𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) =  𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 +  𝛽𝛽�𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) −  𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡)� −  𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) −  𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡), (2) 
𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) =  𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡).         (3) 
In the above system, 𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡), 𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡), and 𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡) are random uncorrelated shocks affecting, respectively, 
household demand, aggregate supply and the money supply with 𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡)~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2), 𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡)~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2), 
𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡)~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤2). 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 is full employment output, 𝑚𝑚0 is the initial money supply and 1 > 𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽 > 0.  
Imposing market clearing and solving for the equilibrium price, we find 
𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) =  1
𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽
[𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡)] + 𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡)+𝜃𝜃𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡)−𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽  .   (4) 
From (4) it can be seen that increases in 𝑚𝑚0, 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡), 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡) all lead to an increase in the price 
level. As is well know, if expectations are formed rationally in such an economy, then the ability to 
influence the price level does not translate into the ability to manipulate the economy.3 That is, 
𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡)+𝜃𝜃𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡)−𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡)
𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽
,        (5) 
such that 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡)+𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡)−𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡)
𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽
= 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡)+𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡)+𝜃𝜃𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡)
𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽
 .    (6) 
                                                          
3 Here rational expectations is defined as, 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡)|𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)), where the information set, I(t), includes 
knowledge of all exogenous and past variable values and the form but not the size of all current shocks. 
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That is under rational expectations, 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡) and policy--changes in 𝑚𝑚0, 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡), and 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)-- are 
ineffective ways of changing 𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡).4 Monetary policy is neutral and changes in 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡) are 
ineffective as ways of changing 𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) and hence 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) −  𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹, but do produce equivalent changes in both 
𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹. It follows that under rational expectations where current shocks are unrecognized in the 
current period, the economy will vary randomly about 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 but will exhibit neither a political business nor 
political budget cycle. 
To allow policy instruments to have a real effect in the sense of producing a divergence between 𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) 
and 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹, we assume that households have adaptive expectations. Households learn but learn slowly. 
Under adaptive expectations, the economy can now be described as (1) through (4) plus  
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡) =  𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝛾𝛾) 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1)),   1 > 𝛾𝛾 > 0.    (7) 
Substituting (7) into (4), and then substituting the result back into (5) yields5  
 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡) =  1−𝛾𝛾
𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾) [𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)] 
−
𝜃𝜃𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)
𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)  𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1)) +  (1−𝛾𝛾)[𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡)+𝜃𝜃𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡)−𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡)]𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾) .       (8) 
From this it follows that,  
𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) =  𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛾𝛾) [𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)] − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛾𝛾) 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1) 
+ (1 − 𝛾𝛾)�𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) + 𝜃𝜃𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡)] + �(𝛽𝛽 − 1)(1 − 𝛾𝛾) + 𝜃𝜃�𝑣𝑣(𝑡𝑡)�
𝜃𝜃 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛾𝛾) , 
or   𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 = 𝜆𝜆0[𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)] − 𝜆𝜆1𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1) +  𝜀𝜀(𝑡𝑡)  (9) 
where 1 > 𝜆𝜆0,𝜆𝜆1 > 0 and 𝜀𝜀(𝑡𝑡) is white noise.6 
It follows that 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 can now be influenced by policy. An increase in either type of government 
spending will result in aggregate output rises relative to its long run equilibrium value. That is,  
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)
𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆0 = 𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾) > 0,  for i = 1,2.        (10)  
Whether the increase in 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 is permanent or transitory, contemporaneous output increases and then 
slowly converges back to 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹. The time path of c(t) is slightly more complicated. A permanent increase in 
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 results in an immediate fall in 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) (but less than the increase in 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖) followed by a further slow fall to 
its permanently lower level. In the interim, 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡 + 𝑗𝑗) −  𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) −  ∆𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 is higher than it will be once the 
expected and actual price level comes together at the permanently higher level. A single period 
(transitory) change in 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 produces a similar effect in the short run, a jump in the price level and a fall in 
contemporaneous consumption. However through time, 𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡),𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡), 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) all return to their 
                                                          
4 In this case 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) will vary randomly with 𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) about 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 ≡  𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 −  𝑔𝑔1 − 𝑔𝑔2. 
5 In the absence of shocks the system will converge to an equilibrium where 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1).  From (8) 
this implies 𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡) = [𝛼𝛼−𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹+𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0+𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡)+𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)]
𝜃𝜃
. From (9) and (10) it can also be seen that as 𝛾𝛾 approaches 1 
policy becomes ineffective in influencing aggregate output. 
6 Where 𝜆𝜆1 < 1 is needed for stability. 
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previous level with the length of the time path depending on how quickly the expected price adjusts to 
the ongoing changes in the price level.7 
Thus far there is no distinction in the effect generated by the two types of government spending.  Both 
𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡), now considered to be government consumption, and 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡), capital expenditures, are produced 
at constant cost (the loss of unit of c(t)) and both have the same transitory and permanent effect on the 
aggregate output supplied and household consumption. From the perspective of the governing party 
facing election, however, the two types of spending may generate different levels of voter support and 
the two types of spending may differ in their recognition/visibility by voters at the time of the election. 
The first of these will be used to explain the equilibrium composition of aggregate government spending 
while the second will be used to explain the timing of their provision over the governing cycle. To focus 
on the implications for policy we set all the shocks equal to zero and abstract from the randomness 
affecting the model.  
To model the behaviour of the governing party over the election cycle, we begin by assuming that the 
party is interested in maximizing voter support over a governing cycle whose length is T periods. The 
level of support the party receives each period depends upon the levels of 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡) it provides 
along with the level of household consumption that can be undertaken after household taxes are paid. 
To focus on the level and composition of government spending, we avoid the complications that arise 
under deficit financing and assume that the government can run neither a deficit nor a surplus. This 
implies that the government also determines household consumption.  That is, 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) ≡ 𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) − 𝜏𝜏(𝑡𝑡) =
𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) −  𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) −  𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡), where 𝜏𝜏(𝑡𝑡)represents aggregate tax collections. To discuss this problem 
analytically, we assume that the support that the governing party wishes to maximize over the 
governing interval of T periods is, V(t), takes the following specific form, max𝑉𝑉(𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡),𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)) = � 𝑉𝑉�𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡),𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡),𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)�𝑇𝑇
0
= � [𝑎𝑎 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑏𝑏 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑑𝑑 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)]𝑇𝑇
0
 
    = ∑ (𝑎𝑎[𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) −𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡))] + 𝑏𝑏 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑑𝑑 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡))𝑇𝑇0 ,   
subject to 
 𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾) [𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)] − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1) +  𝜀𝜀(𝑡𝑡),     𝑡𝑡 = 0 … .𝑇𝑇 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡) =  𝛾𝛾
𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾) [𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)] + (1−𝛾𝛾)(𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾) 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1)  
and where 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(−1) = 𝛼𝛼−𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹+𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0+𝑔𝑔1(−1)+𝑔𝑔2(−1)
𝜃𝜃
  and 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑇𝑇) is free.    (11) 
Setting this up as a Lagrangian  
ℒ�𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡),𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)� = � (𝑎𝑎[ln (𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) −𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡))] + 𝑏𝑏 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑑𝑑 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡))𝑇𝑇
0
 
+𝜑𝜑(𝑡𝑡) �𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 − 𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾) [𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)] + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1)�   (12) 
                                                          
7 From (10) it can be seen that the size of the short run effect is increasing in the weight given to past prices, 1 − 𝛾𝛾, 
and the relative importance of the real versus nominal shocks, 𝛽𝛽.  
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where the first order conditions for an internal optimum are: 
𝜕𝜕ℒ(𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) = −𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑏𝑏𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜑𝜑(𝑡𝑡) = 0   𝑡𝑡 = 0, . .𝑇𝑇,  (13) 
𝜕𝜕ℒ(𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡) = −𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡) −  𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜑𝜑(𝑡𝑡) = 0   𝑡𝑡 = 0, . .𝑇𝑇,  (14) 
𝜕𝜕ℒ(𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 − 𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾) {[𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)] + 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1)} = 0.   (15) 
From (13) and (14) it can be seen that 𝑏𝑏
𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)  or  𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏. That is, the optimal long run strategy 
for the incumbent governing party is to provide the two types of government spending in fixed 
proportions depending on their relative weight in generating electoral support. From the form of (13) 
and (14) it is also apparent that expansions and contractions in government size (𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)) will 
take place though proportional expansions/contractions of the two components. 
Equation (15) can now be written as 
𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 = 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛾𝛾) {[𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)] − 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1)}, 
where from footnote (5) it can be seen that convergence to equilibrium price implies 𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹. 
However a transitory increase in either 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) or 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡), with 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1) predetermined, means that 
𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 becomes positive. Given that the governing party starts from a position of equilibrium, any 
transitory increase in government services will be larger than the fall in household consumption and this 
in turn implies that voter support can be increased.8 The conditioning comment is that the timing of 
such an increase must be varied over the governing interval so as not to become predictable to voters 
and incorporated into their expectation of a price change at that time in the election cycle. To the extent 
that pre-election spending becomes predictable, opportunism along these lines becomes ineffective. 
At present we have motivated opportunism but have nothing in the analysis to suggest a repeating cycle 
of government expenditure in the period leading into an election nor anything to suggest what type of 
government spending would be used for opportunism. However it is often argued that voters tend to 
forget past government contributions, so that what has been done in the past will generate less 
electoral support than what is done in the period immediately before an election. In addition, some 
types of government expenditure may be inherently more visible to voters than others and hence 
deteriorate less quickly in voters’ memories. As argued in the introduction, capital expenditures on 
items such as infrastructure are often argued to much more visible to voters than equivalent amounts of 
government consumption. 
Our final step is then to add these dimensions to the model by having government spending increase 
over time in terms of its effectiveness in generating electoral support at the rate, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, where the 
rate at which consumption expenditures grow in effectiveness, 𝑟𝑟1, is slower than that of capital 
                                                          
8 Note that a permanent change in government spending would distort the community’s output composition away 
from the optimal proportion (too much government, too much of one type of government spending and too little 
private consumption).  This would lower voter support relative to a potential competitor who promised to leave 
the optimal proportions unaltered. 
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expenditure, 𝑟𝑟2. This implies that across time the voting effectiveness of both types of government 
expenditure will increase, with the effectiveness of 𝑔𝑔2 increasing relative to 𝑔𝑔1.   
ℒ�𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡),𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)� = � (𝑎𝑎[ln (𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) −𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡))] + 𝑏𝑏(1 + 𝑟𝑟1)𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑑𝑑(1 + 𝑟𝑟2)𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡))𝑇𝑇
0
 
+𝜑𝜑(𝑡𝑡) �𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 − 𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾) [𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)] + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1)�.   (16) 
where the first order conditions for an internal optimum are now : 
𝜕𝜕ℒ(𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) = −𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑏𝑏(1+𝑟𝑟1)𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) − 𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜑𝜑(𝑡𝑡) = 0   𝑡𝑡 = 0, . .𝑇𝑇,  (17) 
𝜕𝜕ℒ(𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡) = −𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟2)𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡) −  𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜑𝜑(𝑡𝑡) = 0   𝑡𝑡 = 0, . .𝑇𝑇,  (18) 
𝜕𝜕ℒ(𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 − 𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾)𝜃𝜃+𝛽𝛽(1−𝛾𝛾) {[𝛼𝛼 − 𝑦𝑦𝐹𝐹 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚0 + 𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)] − 𝜃𝜃𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡 − 1)} = 0.   (19) 
From (17) and (18) it can be seen that 𝑏𝑏(1+𝑟𝑟1)𝑡𝑡
𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟2)𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)   or  𝑔𝑔2(𝑡𝑡)𝑔𝑔1(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑑𝑑(1+𝑟𝑟2)𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏(1+𝑟𝑟1)𝑡𝑡. That is, the optimal 
spending proportions by government will change over the governing cycle with the proportion of capital 
expenditures in the budget rising relative to consumption the closer it gets to the upcoming election. 
Stated alternatively, the greater the recognition given to capital expenditures means that for equivalent 
increases in 𝑔𝑔1 and 𝑔𝑔2, 𝑔𝑔2 will generate a greater rise in voter support later in the governing cycle and 
hence be used relative to 𝑔𝑔1 as the upcoming election approaches. The ratio of capital expenditures in 
the government budget should rise over the course of the governing cycle. Whether or not aggregate 
government spending generally will rise over the governing cycle then depends upon two conditions: 
whether or not government spending increases in its ability to generate electoral support faster than 
does private consumption;9 and the weight attached to past prices in the expectations formed by 
producers. As long as there is some inertia arising from the weighting of the past in the formation of 
expectations, there can be opportunism and hence some element of a political business cycle. Even 
without this, however, the differential political visibility of capital expenditures as a reminder of the 
current government’s contribution to the economy will produce a political budget cycle in ratio of 
government capital to consumption expenditures. 
III. Data and variables 
To test these hypotheses we use a dataset that covers 14 major Indian states and is spread over 54 years 
(1959-60 to 2012-13).10 The 14 states comprise more than 90 percent of both India’s population and 
                                                          
9 Here we have assumed that increases in private consumption (through reduced taxes) do not grow in their 
electoral effectiveness over time (otherwise the ratio of private consumption to government spending would be 
higher at the beginning of the governing period than at the end and the state governments would be running 
surpluses prior to the election). Alt and Lassen (2006) use differences in the degree of fiscal transparency in this 
way to explain variations in fiscal balance across countries.   
10 The selected states are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Overdependence on the 
central transfers hampers the fiscal autonomy of the small and/or special category states. Therefore such states 
are ignored from the analysis. Among the selected states, Gujarat was carved out from Bombay state in 1960 and 
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domestic product for the period of our study. The sources of our data and methods used to construct 
the variables are set out in the Data appendix. State-specific summary statistics are provided in 
appendix Table A1. 
Because we argue that capital expenditures are relatively more visible in comparison to other revenue 
expenditures in the budget, the ratio of capital to other state expenditures becomes our primary 
dependent variable. The importance of capital expenditures in the state budget is measured in two 
different ways: (1) the share of capital expenditure in noninterest total government expenditure, and (2) 
the ratio of capital to current state expenditures. Then to compare our hypothesis to the alternative 
hypothesis that capital expenditures generate a political budget cycle in levels, we examine how a 
change in the share of capital expenditures affects the aggregate expenditure size of state governments 
and its budgetary balance. For that, the ratios of noninterest total government expenditure and state 
fiscal deficits or surpluses to state gross domestic product (SGDP) are used.11 Columns (1) – (4) in Table 
A1 present state-specific means and standard deviations of all four fiscal measures over the sample 
period of our study. These figures document the enormous variation in all four fiscal measures that 
takes place across the major Indian states. 
Our set of explanatory variables can be divided into two categories: variables of interest and control 
variables. The variables of interest are constructed to capture the timing of state expenditures over the 
governing cycle. In this regard political budget cycle (PBC) theories predict that fiscal instruments will be 
manipulated by incumbent governments to create a favorable environment for re-election. Since 
economic outcomes are expected to affect election outcomes, policy expenditures must be manipulated 
prior to the election. To capture this a dummy variable is often used and for our purposes, election year, 
is constructed as taking the value 1 in the year before the election and 0 for all other years. In India, as 
in other Westminster parliamentary systems, while an election mandate is given for a maximum period 
not all governments can complete the full (five year) term. Coalition governments in particular struggle 
to maintain required support in the state assembly and, when a government falls prematurely, fresh 
mid-term elections are held. Because the occurrence of a mid-term election is typically unpredictable, 
incumbent governments will then find it difficult to plan and implement opportunistic policies. This 
reasoning led Khemani (2004) to search for evidence of the PBC at the state level in India by testing the 
hypothesis that it was the inclusion of mid-term elections in the election year variable that explained the 
lack of evidence of a PBC. That is, by considering only scheduled elections, a variable taking the value 1 
for the year before a scheduled election and 0 for other years, the data would better identify 
opportunism because the time of the election is exogenously set allowing governments the predictable 
interval needed to implement opportunistic spending. In contrast to the timing predicted by these PBC 
hypotheses, our model predicts that the share of visible state expenditures, i.e. capital expenditures, will 
increase over the entire governing interval rather than simply in the period immediately before the 
upcoming election. This also implies that the unexpected loss of parliamentary confidence mid-term or 
the unexpected opportunity ‘to surf’ (go to the polls early to take advantage of favourable circumstance) 
should not change the compositional pattern of spending established up to that point. Even if spending 
                                                          
Haryana from Punjab in 1966. Data for these two states is available from the year of their creation and that leaves 
us with an unbalanced panel dataset. 
11 Fiscal deficit in India is defined as excess of total budget expenditure over total revenue receipts excluding 
borrowings. A large deficit would mean a large amount of borrowing. A negative (positive) number means fiscal 
deficit (surplus). 
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could be increased somewhat at the last minute, this would not overcome the prediction that visible 
spending should be higher in the later years of the governing term. To test whether the predicted 
growth in capital spending takes place over the life of a parliamentary government we use the number 
of years since the last election, elapse, as the appropriate metric. A positive coefficient on elapse would 
provide evidence consistent with the targeting of capital projects with greater political visibility across 
the life of a government.12 
The set of control variables consists of six economic and political regressors: per capita SGDP in constant 
prices (2004-05 rupees), the contribution of agriculture to SGDP, state revenue receipts left after 
meeting committed expenditures (called fiscal space), political alignment, years when states were 
governed by the same party as that elected for the center, the years when the congress party was in 
power at the state level, and the years when each state was governed by a regional party. Reasoning for 
their inclusion begins with Wagner's law, the hypothesis that state spending will vary directly with the 
scale and complexity of state output. The effect of state income on capital expenditures is more 
complicated. Here long run steady state analysis implies that consumption will rise relative to saving and 
investment as wealth is accumulated and states develop. To control for different levels of development 
across states we use each state’s real per capita income. Second, although the contribution of 
agricultural related activities to gross domestic product (GDP) has fallen in recent times, agriculture’s 
contribution to SGDP is still significant (see column 6, Table A1) and varies widely across Indian states. In 
addition its inverse, activities more associated with industrialism and urbanization, would be expected 
to elicit greater capital infrastructural support from state governments and be more visible to voters. 
Third, fiscal rules as they relate to the ability to spend and/or tax are often a significant influence on 
state policies (Nerlich and Reuter, 2015). At the state level in India, Chakraborty and Dash (2013) have 
shown that it is development expenditures that are cut strategically to meet budget deficit targets set 
under an imposed fiscal rule.13 Because non-development spending includes such budget items as 
interest payment, administrative services, and pension payments that are essentially committed, it falls 
on capital items within development spending as the flexible component in the budget that must adjust 
to projected deficits. To measure the extent of this pressure on capital spending we have constructed 
variable, fiscal space, defined as the share of revenue receipts left after meeting ‘required’ non-
development expenditures. With greater fiscal space higher levels of capital expenditure, a larger sized 
government and smaller fiscal deficits are expected. Fourth, Arulampalam et al. (2009) have shown that 
when the governing parties at the central and state level in India are closely aligned, the aligned states 
typically receive higher discretionary transfers from the center. Such transfers are usually project-based, 
capital intensive and conditional in nature. Thus political alignment, a dummy variable taking the value 1 
when the two governing parties are politically aligned and 0 otherwise, is expected to be associated with 
higher share of capital in state expenditures. Partisanship is another important variable that has been 
shown to have a strong influence on the composition of government budgets (Potrafke, 2016). In the 
case of India, the Indian National Congress party, known more simply as the Congress party, is an 
ideologically center-left national political party that dominated particularly the early elections at the 
                                                          
12 Note that evidence that elapse is significant is not inconsistent with Khemani’s hypothesis. Rather by using the 
ratio in early as well as late governing years, the test permits the emergence of evidence of opportunism even 
when targeted spending in the pre-election period is not significantly different from an average of all earlier years. 
13 Development expenditure constitutes the aggregate spending on social and economic services. Spending on 
items such as health, education, infrastructure, agriculture, and industry, rural development, roads and transport 
are parts of it. 
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center and in many of the states. For example, Congress formed the government in 54 percent of the 
fiscal years in our sample period and their presence would be expected to have had a distinctive impact 
on the way fiscal policies are chosen. A dummy variable congress is used to differentiate between the 
years ruled by the Congress party and other parties, defined as 1 if the Congress party has ruled, 0 
otherwise. Finally, a number of distinctive regional political parties emerged as challengers to Congress 
party dominance at the state level in the 1970s and 1980s such that by the end of our time period many 
of the major Indian states had been governed by state-specific regional parties for considerable periods. 
Because such parties succeed in part through their emphasis on state relative to national interests, the 
policies adopted under these governments might be expected to differ systematically from the policy set 
of their national-oriented rivals.14 To control for the impact of regional parties on the composition of 
state budgets we introduced a variable, regional, that takes the value 1 in years when a regional party 
was in power in the state, 0 otherwise. 
IV. Empirical specification and results 
Our theoretical model highlights the following testable hypotheses. First, capital expenditures as the 
most politically visible category of state budgets should rise over the course of the governing period, 
peaking in the year leading into the next election. This hypothesis is tested in comparison with the two 
PBC timing hypotheses discussed earlier. Second, without state budgets in total responding to the 
election cycle, government consumption expenditures with less immediate voter visibility should be 
larger in the early years of governing tenure and then fall as the next election approaches. Hence 
complementary to the first prediction, the ratio of capital to consumption in the state budget should rise 
over the governing period and be more sensitive to governing duration than the share of capital in the 
total state budget. Third, while our analysis does not presume that the spending items as a group have 
greater voter visibility than do taxes, we test for that possibility. First we test the hypothesis that there 
is a cycle in the timing of deficits and surpluses over the governing interval (with surpluses early and 
deficits later and no aggregate spending cycle).  We also test for the presence of a traditional spending 
cycle by seeing whether total state expenditures as a proportion of SGDP rise over the governing cycle.   
Empirical specification 
As the summary statistics in Table A1 suggest, there has been substantial variation in all the variables 
both over time and across states. In such cases standard panel models, such as pooled OLS, fixed effects 
and random effects panel models are often used to study the relation between the variables of interest. 
However a major drawback of these models is that they capture only static relationships and are unable 
to incorporate the dynamic nature of interrelated variables. To handle processes that evolve over time 
and the time series issues raised by such combinations of variables, the extensions of the autoregressive 
distributed lag approach to panel analysis (hereafter panel ARDL) proposed by Pesaran et al. (1997, 
1999) have proven to be particularly useful. In its most general form, the error-correction form of the  
autoregressive distributed lag ARDL (p, q) model, where p is the lag of the dependent variable and q is 
the lag of the independent variables, can be written as: 
∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝−1𝑗𝑗=1 ∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +  ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞−1𝑗𝑗=0 ∆𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 −  �𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�� + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,  (20) 
                                                          
14 See Dash and Raja (2013) for a more detailed testing of the effects of political ideology and partisanship on the 
level and composition of state expenditures. 
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where Y is a fiscal policy outcome, X represents a set of explanatory variables including the set of 
election timing and control variables, γ and δ are the short-run coefficients related to fiscal outcome and 
its determinants, β’s are the long-run coefficients, ϕ is the speed of adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium, ϵ is a time-varying disturbance, and the subscripts i and t represent state and time, 
respectively. The term in square brackets is the long-run regression equation, which is derived from: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,  where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ~𝐼𝐼(0).      (21) 
Unlike traditional cointegration approach, where long-run relationship between variables can exist only 
if all variables are of the same order of integration, Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that the panel ARDL 
model can be used with variables of different order of integration. This allows for the simultaneous 
existence of cointegration (a long run equilibrium relationship) among the I(1) variables, an equilibrating 
process of convergence to the long run in response to random shocks and a short run process of change 
among the I(0) variables about the long run equilibrium time path. Given that our variable set combines 
political variables that are primarily stationary I(0) in nature (do not trend) with economic variables that 
can be either stationary I(0) or nonstationary I(1), panel ARDL estimation suits our purposes well.15 
Another important advantage of using panel ARDL model is that no formal test is required to check for 
cointegration among the variables of concern. Only the error-correction term in (20) is required to be 
negative and not lower than -2 to confirm cointegration among variables. However for completeness we 
begin the modeling of our dynamic process by asking whether an error correction process is appropriate 
for our panel and hence ask if there is any evidence that the nonstationary I(1) economic variables in our 
model are cointegrated. To answer this we use the Westerlund (2007) error correction model panel 
cointegration test that tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration by assessing whether the error-
correction term in a conditional panel error-correction model is equal to zero. Table A3 in the data 
appendix presents these results for both the ratio of capital to total government expenditures and the 
ratio of capital to current expenditures. The results allow us to reject the hypothesis of no cointegration 
and proceed by comparing alternative versions of the panel error correction model. 
The general model in equation (20) can be estimated in three alternative forms. At one extreme, we 
have the dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimator, an error-correction form of the static fixed-effects 
model. This version allows the intercept to vary across the states but restricts all other parameters and 
error variances to be the same. At the other extreme, the mean group (MG) model by proposed Pesaran 
and Smith (1995) estimates separate equations for each state and then calculates the unweighted mean 
of all estimates. It allows all coefficients to vary both in the long-run and short-run. The intermediate 
alternative is the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). It allows the 
intercepts, short-run coefficients and error variances to differ across the states, but requires the long-
run coefficients to be equal. After estimating all three versions, a Hausman test can be used to indicate 
the more appropriate model for our analysis.16 
                                                          
15 We use the first generation test of the panel unit root of Fisher-type (Choi, 2001), and the second generation 
test of the panel unit root of Pesaran (2007) to confirm that the orders of integration of all our variables are either 
I(0) or I(1). The individual results are presented in the data appendix as Table A2. 
16 Stata-based xtpmg routine developed by Blackburne and Frank (2007) is used to estimate all three models (MG, 
PMG, and DFE). 
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The PMG estimator by assuming that the long run elasticities are the same across states will yield more 
efficient estimates than the MG estimator if that restriction is true, but inconsistent estimates if the 
slope coefficients are not equal. A significant Hausman statistic of MG versus PMG will reject the 
assumption of long-run slope homogeneity and imply that the MG model is superior to the PMG. The 
DFE model further restricts the coefficients of the model by requiring the short run coefficients and the 
speed of adjustment to be equal (as well as the long run).  However doing so introduces a simultaneous 
equation bias if endogeneity arises between the error term and the lagged dependent variable. A 
significant Hausman statistics of MG versus DFE suggests that the simultaneous equation bias is serious 
and implies the MG model is preferred to the DFE model. 
Empirical Results 
Our emphasis on the governing term and its duration rather than simply the pre-election period allows 
our hypothesis to be distinguished from that of Khemani (2004) who tests for the Indian states a similar 
hypothesis over the shorter 1960 – 1992 time period. Khemani’s insight as to why evidence of a PBC was 
missing for India was the recognition that India’s parliamentary system of government requires the 
governing coalition to “maintaining the confidence” of parliament where the inability to do so means 
that governing durations are often shorter than the legislated maximum and somewhat unpredictable in 
length. This in turn means that because opportunistic spending needs to be implemented not later than 
the election itself, evidence of opportunism would likely be absent in cases of unexpected mid-term 
elections and hence present only for those elections that arose at the scheduled end of the governing 
period. 
We then begin the presentation of our empirical work in Table 1 by using a fixed effects panel regression 
to re-examine Khemani’s scheduled election hypothesis in relation to capital expenditures over the 
longer 1959 to 2012 time period now available.17 Columns (1) and (2) confirm Khemani’s finding that 
when all pre-election years are included as a test of opportunism, the data are not consistent and that 
by excluding mid-term elections (to consider only scheduled elections) evidence consistent with 
opportunism hypothesis. Note however that in our results the prediction that scheduled elections will 
be positively related to capital’s expenditure share of the state budget is confirmed only if the lowest 
conventional level of significance is used to establish the confidence interval (10 per cent). Thus while 
the data does not contradict the hypothesis, the evidence in its favour is not strong (at least for capital 
expenditures).     
-- Table 1 about here -- 
Under our visibility hypothesis, the ratio of capital expenditure should rise throughout the governing 
duration such that elapse should be related positively to the two capital spending ratios. In columns 3 
and 4 of Table 1 the results of these tests are presented. Both ratios, the ratio of capital to total 
government expenditure and the ratio of capital to consumption expenditures, are found to be 
positively related to elapse as expected, with coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at 
the five percent significance level. Also as expected, the ratio of capital to state consumption spending is 
found to be somewhat more responsive and marginally more significant. In relative terms, then, the 
hypothesis that opportunism produces a predictable time pattern of increasing politically visible capital 
expenditures over the life of an established government (rather than a single outburst of capital 
                                                          
17 See Khemani (2004, Table 5c, p.143). 
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expenditure in the year before the next election) is found to be consistent with the data for Indian 
states. 
It is interesting to note that the effects produced by our control variables are virtually identical across all 
model specifications and serve to document relationships that are of interest in their own right. For 
example, the results indicate that both capital spending ratios fall with rising state per capita incomes, 
rise as the share of agriculture in state output falls over time, and rise with the degree of discretionary 
flexibility in state budgets (as represented by fiscal space). Similarly, the public choice predictions that 
opportunism through visible capital expenditure will increase as state and central governments become 
more politically aligned and that the spending partisanship of the center-left Congress party (increasing 
consumption relative to investment spending) are both found to be consistent with the data. In the case 
of regional parties, however, a partisan effect in the capital ratios is only suggested rather than 
confirmed by the data. While the estimated coefficient is consistently negative across all four columns, 
none of the coefficients are significantly different from zero even at the 10 percent significance level.    
While the estimations of Table 1 are insightful, the fixed effects procedure used assumes the existence a 
static equilibrium rather than a dynamic process of adjustment among a set of variables that evolve 
through time. Because the long run is embedded in data that can include a potential convergence 
process together with likely responses to purely short run influences, we are interested in methods that 
can separate these effects from the long-run process describing the ratio of capital expenditures in state 
budgets over time and particularly over the election cycle. For this reason we turn to the results of using 
panel ARDL estimation as outlined above. Before beginning we note that one notable feature of the 
results in Table 1 is that each of the proposed equations explain much more of the variation within each 
state over time than across states at any point in time. This suggests that heterogeneity issues may be 
important in estimating a single dynamic model of adjustment so that methods that impose equality 
among different coefficients may result in serious bias. With this in mind we present in Tables 2 and 3 
the three alternative versions of a dynamic error correction model: the MG, PMG, and DFE models. 
-- Tables 2 and 3 about here -- 
As would be expected, the two sets of three ARDL models describing the evolution of the two shares of 
capital expense over time are quite similar in the sign and size of their estimated coefficients. Within 
each table, all three models present a similar looking long run about which transitory shocks and 
variations in the model’s covariates produce a short run process of adjustment and convergence back to 
the long run equilibrium path. In all cases the error correction term is negative and significantly different 
from zero, indicating cointegration among the I(1) variables reinforcing the equilibrium nature of the 
indicated long run path.18 A set of Hausman tests, however, suggests that the different homogeneity 
assumptions of the PMG and DFE approaches will introduce sufficient bias in the estimates to make the 
coefficients of the MG model the more appropriate form of the underlying relationship. This is true for 
both sets of estimates. 
In terms of our variable of interest, the significant positive coefficient estimate of elapse in column (1) of 
Table 2 indicates that the data is consistent with the predicted cycle of increased capital spending in 
state expenditures through successive years of governing. In this sense the capital spending cycle forms 
                                                          
18 Note that the estimated error correction terms are both large in absolute size indicating relatively rapid 
convergence of departures in the capital ratios to their equilibrium long run path. 
15 
 
an important part of the long run. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that, everything else 
remaining the same, the share of capital expenditure increases by 2.8 percent each year leading into the 
next election. Our complementary prediction, that capital spending will grow relative to state 
consumption spending as the next election approaches is also confirmed by the data. The coefficient 
estimate on elapse in column (1) of Table 3 implies that as the next election gets closer, capital spending 
will increase each year by 3.7 percent relative to consumption spending. For both hypotheses the use of 
error correction modeling to separate short run adjustment from the longer run equilibrium time path 
has resulted in an increase in estimated size and significance of the underlying long run relationship 
between the capital spending ratios and governing duration. The coefficient estimates in our preferred 
ARDL models are now significantly different from zero at 1 percent. 
The separation of the short run and convergence process from the long run has made no difference to 
the interpretation of the role played by some of our control variables. The coefficient estimates on state 
per capita income, the share of agriculture in state GDP and fiscal space the ARDL coefficient estimates 
are now only marginally larger in absolute size than in the earlier static fixed effect case of Table 1. 
Hence the share of capital expenditure in total noninterest state spending declines as real per capita 
incomes rise, consistent with convergence to a longer run stationary state in the state capital to output 
ratio. In practice it’s a well-documented feature of India’s public finances that the share of capital in the 
state budgets has shrunk over the years, particularly since the early 1980s. This is often attributed to 
stagnant state revenues combined with increasing pressure on consumption expenditure coming from 
rising salaries, subsidies and interest payments to crowd out capital expenditure (Rao, 2002; McCarten, 
2003). Capital expenditure is largely financed by debt issues and with the introduction in the early 2000s 
of a fiscal rule that imposes a ceiling on the size of fiscal deficit at the state level, capital spending has 
been further constrained. Particularly strong has been the decline in public investment in the agriculture 
sector. Rising consumption subsidies for fertilizers, irrigation, electricity, credit and other agricultural 
inputs have arisen at the expense of public infrastructural investment in agriculture (Jha, 2007). Finally, 
as discussed earlier, a diminishing amount of fiscal space is consistent with the reduction in the 
availability of state resources for the capital expenditure accounts. 
On the other hand the separation of the long run from the short run convergence process has changed 
somewhat the relative importance of the political variables. The earlier finding that Congress party 
control is associated with lower capital spending is now seen to be less reliable as a partisan hypothesis 
while regional parties are now indicated as addressing public investments concerns at the state level 
better than their national counterparts. Finally, political alignment is still associated with a higher share 
of capital in state expenditures, but its coefficient is now insignificantly different from zero. 
The findings of Table 2 and 3 complement the recent literature that predicts that electoral cycles will 
appear within the subcomponents of aggregate spending rather than in its level. Our contribution is to 
note that such evidence may be spread across the life of the incumbent government rather than 
concentrated solely at its end. However while our capital spending model does not require an aggregate 
spending cycle, its logic would generate an election cycle in aggregate spending and/or state budget 
surpluses and deficits if spending items in the budget were more politically visible than their financing 
through taxes (as in fiscal illusion). For this reason we extend our analysis to examine these possibilities. 
To search for the presence of an electoral cycle in aggregate fiscal policy across Indian states, we 
estimated the three ARDL models for two aggregate fiscal measures: noninterest total state spending 
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and fiscal surpluses both as a percentage of SGDP. The results are presented in the two columns of Table 
4 where the ARDL results reported are only for the more appropriate model selected by the Hausman 
test. The results suggest that both of these aggregate fiscal variables are explained primarily by our 
control variables. Aggregate spending in column (1) is consistent with Wagner’s Law and with the 
presence of fiscal space leading to an increase in overall as well as capital expenditure. The fiscal surplus 
is shown to be responsive to the business cycle (reductions in per capita income met by rising deficits) 
and with agricultures share of state output. In terms of partisan effects, it appears that the Congress 
party is a more conservative budget manager, spending somewhat less and running larger surpluses 
(smaller deficits) than their political rivals. However, there is no systematic effect indicated for elapse on 
either aggregate fiscal policy measure, with elapse making no significant contribution to aggregate 
spending and taking a sign that is more consistent with rising budget surpluses over the life of a 
government than producing expansionary deficits. The data then fail to support opportunistic electoral 
cycles in aggregate fiscal measures. The evidence is more consistent with the hypothesis that incumbent 
political parties find it not politically advantageous to engage in expansionary spending and/or budget 
deficits for re-election purposes, perhaps anticipating that such policies can cause macroeconomic 
instability and result in accumulating government debt that will lower their electoral chances.19 Instead 
incumbent governments find it safer to manipulate the composition of the budget strategically, reducing 
spending on specific components early in the term to allow their more advantageous provision later in 
the governing cycle. 
-- Table 4 about here -- 
Sensitivity analysis 
In this sub-section we check whether our findings are sensitive to minor modifications in the definition 
of our variable of interest and the measure of capital in our subcomponent of visible spending. 
In the earlier part of this paper we argued that Khemani’s (2004) hypothesis that only scheduled 
elections should be taken into account in a test for opportunism is less relevant for our hypothesis that 
argues for an upward trend in those budget items with greater visible spending across all governing 
periods (independent of length). Nevertheless, the greater is the likelihood that the exogeneously 
scheduled election date will be maintained, the greater would be the willingness of the government to 
lower its capital spending early in its mandate for more effective use later. Hence while the case for 
using scheduled elections alone is not as strong, there may still be more of a trend associated with 
governing intervals associated with exogenously scheduled elections. During the period of our study, 
167 state elections were held and of them 43 involved mid-term elections while the remaining 124 were 
scheduled elections. This suggests that if we modify our elapse variable to include elapse only in 
scheduled elections, i.e., use scheduled elapse, we should expect the size of the coefficient estimate and 
the t-statistic of scheduled elapse to increase relative to our earlier findings (using all election periods). 
Table 5 reports these results for the revised variable in relation to our two capital ratios and the two 
aggregate fiscal measures. Once again only the more appropriate ARDL model results are shown as 
selected by the Hausman test. The results show that the coefficient estimates and associated t-statistics 
in columns (1) and (2) do rise as predicted (compared to columns (1) in Tables 2 and 3). Similarly the 
                                                          
19 For instance, fiscal deficits at the state level are mostly debt financed. Increasing debt financing in pre-election 
years can lead to higher inflation in the post-election years. 
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insignificance of the coefficient estimates in columns (3) and (4) confirm the earlier finding that the data 
provide no evidence of an opportunistic election cycle in either measure of aggregate fiscal policy. As 
such these results reinforce the predications made for electoral cycles in capital spending and their 
absence for our measures of aggregate fiscal outcomes. 
-- Table 5 about here – 
As a second robustness test we use the fact that in state budgets capital expenditure consist of two 
broad types: state capital outlays as opposed to loans and advances made by state governments. Capital 
outlays consist of expenditures that the government can control directly through its various ministries. 
Loans and advances by the state government, on the other hand, are revenues transferred to such 
quasi-government agencies such as housing boards, electricity boards and various other public sector 
undertakings over which the state government has much less control. This suggests the capital outlay 
component of capital expenditure would be more responsive to political incentives and would be more 
likely to provide evidence of opportunism in its timing if opportunism were present. In Table 6, then, we 
rerun our ARDL models for the more specific definition of visible capital (substituting capital outlays for 
capital expenditure). The results for the more appropriate, Hausman test selected, ARDL models are 
presented in Table 6. Inspection of columns (1) and (2) of that table shows that the results for capital 
outlays that are very similar to those found earlier for capital expenditure (in Tables 2 and 3), with the 
elapse coefficient showing only minor increases in its size and significance. Interpreting this in the 
context of our hypothesis, the results suggest a roughly equivalent degree of political influence in both 
dimensions of capital expenditure. 
-- Table 6 about here – 
Finally we return to the question of the more appropriate time interval needed to reflect political 
decision making that began this section.  To do so we re-estimate the mg version of the elapse error 
correction model of Table 2 using the year prior to a scheduled election rather than elapse as the time 
interval most appropriate to test for presence of election motivated spending. The results, presented as 
column (3) in Table 6, are qualitatively similar to those found earlier for the static fixed effects model. 
That is, while the data is not inconsistent with the hypothesis of opportunism, evidence in support of the 
prediction of a pre-election bulge in capital spending is relatively weak (the coefficient estimate of 
scheduled electionyear(+1) is significantly different from zero only at the low 10 percent level).  
However, rather than interpreting this result as implying only weak support for the hypothesis that 
governments do manipulate their capital spending plans in response to election considerations, the 
stronger results found for elapse in Tables 2 and 3 suggest a predictable pattern of capital spending for 
electoral purposes that spans the entire governing interval. To the extent that capital spending is 
politically more visible than other budget items, the components of a platform of promised capital 
spending can be reallocated intertemporally to permit more capital projects being featured in the later 
stages of the governing cycle.  This implies a diminished role for capital spending early in the governing 
cycle and thus a pattern of increased spending over the life of a government that can be better captured 
by a variable like elapse.   
V. Conclusion 
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In this paper we have argued that one weakness of the usual approach to testing for political 
opportunism in government budgets is the absence of a strong reason for why such expenditures should 
be restricted solely to the period leading into the next election. Here we argue that the need to fulfill a 
set of election platform promises in combination with the characteristic that some budget items better 
attract the attention of voters (with deteriorating memories) leads to a predictable reallocation of 
budgetary spending across the life of a government. Using capital expenditures as our example of more 
politically visible budgetary items, we use data from a set of 14 Indian states over 54 years (1959/60 – 
2012/13) to test the hypotheses that capital expenditure as a ratio of both total government 
expenditure and government consumption alone should rise across the entire governing interval. The 
results are found to be consistent with this hypothesis. In addition the results can be seen to fit the data 
marginally better than do more traditional models that use either all pre-election periods or (for 
parliamentary governments) only the pre-election year of scheduled elections to test for opportunism. 
The analysis also tests for the presence of a similar interval effect on aggregate state expenditures and 
on state budgetary surpluses. The absence of any significant effect there suggests, at least for the major 
Indian states in our sample, that evidence of political influence is more likely to be found in variations in 
the composition of state budgets rather than in its level or in the size of its deficits and surpluses. 
Of more technical interest is the result that the capital spending pattern predictions receive even 
greater support when the model testing for an interval effect allows for the separation of the long run 
from the short run and the convergence process. The ARDL models used to test for a long run 
relationship in this context confirm the existence of a cointegrating relationship among our variables 
and suggest the importance of per capita state income, the share of agriculture, the amount of fiscal 
space as important co-determinants of our capital ratios. Finally, the data presents evidence of partisan 
effects for the regional political parties that arose to challenge the dominance of the Congress party. 
These parties appear to be somewhat more devoted to state development objectives than their national 
party rivals. 
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Data Appendix 
Description and Sources of Data used 
The data used in this paper covers 14 major Indian states: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, 
Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, 
and West Bengal; and spans the fiscal years 1959-60 to 2012-13. Variables are collected from a variety 
of sources as detailed below. 
Public finance variables 
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Bulletin provides longest time-series public finance data at the state 
level. Data for relatively less disaggregated fiscal outcomes such as capital expenditure, current 
expenditure, development and non-development expenditure, spending on debt servicing, revenue 
receipts from tax and non-tax sources, intergovernmental transfers, and debt are available from fiscal 
year 1959-60 onwards. All expenditure variables are net of interest. Various issues of the RBI Bulletin 
have been used to collate this dataset. 
Political variables 
The Election Commission of India (ECI) publishes details of both parliamentary and assembly elections on 
their website (http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html). Information available in ECI’s reports is used to prepare the 
coding of the qualitative variables: election year, elapse, political alignment, congress party, and 
regional party. 
Economic and demographic variables 
Our study has used economic and demographic variables such as per capita state domestic product in 
constant prices (2004-05 rupees), the share of agriculture in state domestic product, and state 
population. Data for these variables are obtained from the National Accounts Statistics. Time-series data 
for variable state domestic product in constant prices (2004-05 rupees) is not readily available for the 
entire period. The base year changes approximately once in every decade, and the method of back-ward 
splicing is used to account for base year adjustment. 
  
 
 
Table A1 
Summary statistics 
State 
Capital 
expenditure/Total 
noninterest 
expenditure [1] 
Capital 
expenditure/Noninterest 
current expenditure [2] 
Fiscal 
deficit/SGDP 
[3] 
Total noninterest 
expenditure/SGDP [4] 
Per capita SGDP 
[5] 
Share of 
agricultural 
output in SGDP [6] 
Fiscal space 
[7] 
Election year 
[8] 
Scheduled 
election year 
[9] Elapse [10] 
Political 
alignment [11] 
Congress 
party [12] 
Regional 
party [13] 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Andhra 
Pradesh 23.57 7.46 0.32 0.14 -1.62 1.66 14.85 3.22 12559 18885 41.99 13.77 67.25 7.97 0.20 0.41 0.19 0.39 2.00 1.49 0.78 0.42 0.70 0.46 0.30 0.46 
Bihar 26.22 10.7 0.39 0.22 -2.47 2.70 20.33 5.43 4150 6083 49.83 14.87 60.30 10.25 0.24 0.43 0.17 0.38 1.76 1.55 0.61 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.31 0.47 
Gujarat 25.45 6.69 0.35 0.12 -1.86 1.92 13.45 3.19 15954 23377 32.87 12.92 65.29 8.80 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.39 1.88 1.41 0.59 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.00 0.00 
Haryana 24.30 10.2 0.35 0.20 -1.54 1.80 14.72 3.02 21151 29594 40.86 14.29 64.93 11.20 0.23 0.43 0.15 0.36 1.81 1.41 0.81 0.40 0.60 0.50 0.19 0.40 
Karnataka 25.60 8.24 0.36 0.17 -1.57 1.60 14.66 3.17 13154 18914 38.57 13.74 67.52 5.70 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.39 1.94 1.47 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.48 0.04 0.19 
Kerala 17.73 6.93 0.22 0.11 -1.87 2.03 13.34 2.56 14718 21481 33.56 14.11 60.57 12.15 0.24 0.43 0.15 0.36 1.81 1.53 0.37 0.49 0.41 0.50 0.04 0.19 
Madhya 
Pradesh 25.20 8.51 0.35 0.16 -1.83 1.87 17.57 4.65 7474 10377 44.01 12.79 68.43 7.27 0.20 0.41 0.17 0.38 2.02 1.47 0.67 0.48 0.70 0.46 0.00 0.00 
Maharashtra 23.09 6.39 0.31 0.11 -1.38 1.48 11.91 2.14 18241 25848 21.27 8.77 58.97 9.91 0.20 0.41 0.19 0.39 2.04 1.50 0.76 0.43 0.87 0.34 0.13 0.34 
Orissa 23.51 7.01 0.32 0.13 -1.65 2.15 14.97 3.64 8492 11848 43.47 13.12 60.39 10.30 0.22 0.42 0.13 0.34 1.87 1.44 0.57 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.31 0.47 
Punjab 25.98 12.3 0.39 0.24 -2.20 2.18 12.32 4.15 16980 21371 43.64 9.19 54.54 18.87 0.22 0.42 0.17 0.38 2.02 1.62 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.41 0.50 
Rajasthan 25.91 9.04 0.37 0.20 -2.08 2.06 14.75 2.97 9810 13632 38.71 9.77 59.54 10.55 0.20 0.41 0.17 0.38 2.02 1.47 0.67 0.48 0.69 0.47 0.00 0.00 
Tamil Nadu 20.24 7.61 0.27 0.13 -1.27 1.39 13.42 2.95 15581 23521 26.37 12.11 66.56 7.37 0.22 0.42 0.17 0.38 1.94 1.55 0.35 0.48 0.15 0.36 0.85 0.36 
Uttar 
Pradesh 27.11 8.09 0.39 0.16 -2.20 2.25 14.12 4.39 6595 8158 41.63 10.08 57.38 11.09 0.26 0.44 0.15 0.36 1.76 1.48 0.65 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.28 0.45 
West Bengal 17.93 6.80 0.23 0.11 -2.35 2.75 11.04 2.43 10724 14813 33.18 6.41 53.61 16.64 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.39 1.83 1.46 0.31 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.09 0.29 
All States 23.69 8.86 0.33 0.17 -1.85 2.04 14.38 4.18 12471 19255 37.83 14.08 61.77 11.99 0.22 0.42 0.17 0.37 1.91 1.48 0.58 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.21 0.41 
Indian States: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal; Time period: 1959-60 to 2012-13.
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   Table A2 
Unit root tests 
 Level 1st Difference 
 Fisher Pesaran Fisher Pesaran 
Log(Capital expenditure/Total 
noninterest expenditure) 
38.7* -5.56*** 544.21*** -16.09*** 
Log(Capital expenditure/Noninterest 
current expenditure) 
38.83* -5.67*** 550.87*** -16.35*** 
Log(Total noninterest 
expenditure/SGDP) 
40.09* -7.22*** 675.02*** -16.9*** 
Fiscal deficit/SGDP 14.14 -6.56*** 418.01*** -14.06*** 
Log(Per capita SGDP) 0.64 -4.43*** 389.22*** -14.77*** 
Log(Share of agricultural output in 
SGDP) 
0.72 -2.32*** 453.72*** -16.22*** 
Log(Fiscal space) 24.08 -3.37*** 415.15*** -17.45*** 
Election Year 605.75*** -17.91*** 845.89*** -17.89*** 
Scheduled Election Year 589.96*** -17.72*** 853.44*** -17.89*** 
Elapse  534.25*** -17.07*** 639.3*** -17.89*** 
Political alignment  98.58*** -5.38*** 460.17*** -16.26*** 
Congress party 77.72*** -4*** 355.11*** -13.11*** 
Regional party 139.45*** -0.9 378.26*** -7.82*** 
Note: (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The null hypothesis for both tests assumes 
that all series are non-stationary. Among first generation unit root tests, the Fisher test is the only one 
compatible with unbalanced dataset. Second generation unit root test proposed by Pesaran (2007) allows for 
cross-sectional dependence among the residuals within the panels. The Stata commands for the two tests are 
xtfisher and pescadf. 
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 Table A3  
Westerlund (2007) error-correction-based panel cointegration tests 
 
Cointegration among log(capital expenditure/total noninterest expenditure), log(per capita 
SGDP), log(agricultural share of state GDP), log(fiscal space) 
Statistic Value z - value P - value 
Gt -2.99 -4.503 0.000 
Ga -12.485 -2.004 0.023 
Pt -11.142 -4.583 0.000 
Pa -11.596 -3.835 0.000 
 
 
Cointegration among log(noninterest capital expense/government consumption), log(per 
capita SGDP), log(agricultural share of state GDP), log(fiscal space) 
Statistic Value Z - value P - value 
Gt -3.145 -4.512 0.000 
Ga -12.640 -2.097 0.018 
Pt -11.148 -4.589 0.000 
Pa -11.644 -3.867 0.000 
Note: The tests used the xtwest command in Stata (see Persyn and Westerlund (2008)).  
For both tests, the results reject the hypothesis that the series are not cointegrated. 
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Table 1 
Fixed Effects estimates of different assumed patterns of opportunistic spending on the ratio 
of capital expenditure relative to total and consumption spending in Indian State budgets 
(Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets) 
 Log(Capital 
expenditure/Total 
noninterest 
expenditure) 
(1) 
Log(Capital 
expenditure/Total 
noninterest 
expenditure) 
(2) 
Log(Capital 
expenditure/Total 
noninterest 
expenditure) 
(3) 
Log(Capital 
expenditure/Noni
nterest current 
expenditure) 
 
(4) 
Election year (+1) 0.036 
(1.47) 
   
Scheduled election 
year (+1) 
 0.053* 
(1.93) 
  
Elapse    0.015** 
(2.15) 
0.020** 
(2.26) 
Log(Per capita 
SGDP) 
-0.234*** 
(12.26) 
-0.235*** 
(12.34) 
-0.239*** 
(12.81) 
-0.323*** 
(13.67) 
Log(Share of 
agricultural output 
in SGDP) 
-0.351*** 
(4.67) 
-0.351*** 
(4.66) 
-0.385*** 
(5.3) 
-0.541*** 
(5.89) 
Log(Fiscal space) 0.346*** 
(7.16) 
0.35*** 
(7.22) 
0.356*** 
(7.45) 
0.401*** 
(6.62) 
Political alignment  0.08*** 
(2.82) 
0.08*** 
(2.81) 
0.078*** 
(2.76) 
0.093*** 
(2.60) 
Congress party -0.082** 
(2.48) 
-0.086*** 
(2.63) 
-0.09*** 
(2.47) 
-0.108*** 
(2.62) 
Regional party -0.043 
(1.14) 
-0.04 
(1.06) 
-0.042 
(1.14) 
-0.062 
(1.34) 
Constant 4.85*** 
(10.01) 
4.85*** 
(10.02) 
4.96*** 
(10.50) 
1.69*** 
(2.84) 
Statistics: 
Observations 
R2 – within 
     - between 
     - overall 
F(7, 699)  
Prob > F 
 
720 
0.511 
0.000 
0.396 
104.15 
0 
 
720 
0.512 
0.000 
0.397 
104.6 
0 
 
734 
0.511 
0.001 
0.387 
105.85 
0 
 
734 
0.521 
0.012 
0.381 
110.77 
0 
(*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.  
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Table 2 
ARDL Panel models of the ratio of capital to total state expenditure: 1959/60 – 2012/13 
(Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets) 
 Mean group (MG) 
(1) 
Pooled Mean Group (PMG) 
(2) 
Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) 
(3) 
Long Run    
Elapse 
 
0.028*** 
(2.81) 
0.022** 
(2.17) 
0.028** 
(2.16)  
Log(Per capita SGDP) -0.289*** 
(4.55) 
-0.273*** 
(8.69) 
-0.278*** 
(7.3) 
Log(Share of agricultural 
output in SGDP) 
-0.507** 
(2.02) 
-0.484*** 
(3.92) 
-0.558*** 
(3.73) 
Log(Fiscal space) 0.372** 
(2.08) 
0.66*** 
(8.63) 
0.422*** 
(4.49) 
Political alignment  0.079 
(1.22) 
0.048 
(1.10) 
0.093* 
(1.77) 
Congress party 0.004 
(0.06) 
-0.041 
(0.88) 
-0.095 
(1.56) 
Regional party 0.187* 
(1.79) 
0.087* 
(1.65) 
0.028 
(0.40) 
Short Run    
Error correction Term -0.610*** 
(9.5) 
-0.436*** 
(6.11) 
-0.432*** 
(14.19) 
D(Log(Per capita SGDP)) 0.018 
(0.012) 
0.022 
(0.23) 
0.088 
(0.77) 
D(Log(Share of agricultural 
output in SGDP)) 
0.008 
(0.05) 
-0.056 
(0.77) 
0.039 
(0.34) 
D(Log(Fiscal space)) -0.183 
(1.47) 
-0.147 
(1.57) 
-0.186*** 
(2.60) 
Constant 3.32*** 
(4.81) 
1.89*** 
(5.81) 
2.39*** 
(5.40) 
No. Observations 722 722 722 
Chosen model MG   
(*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The top panel shows long-run effects, whereas the 
lower panel reports both short-run effects and the speed of adjustment. A Hausman test is used to select the 
appropriate model. 
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Table 3 
ARDL models of the ratio of capital to consumption Indian state expenditures: 1959/60 – 
2012/13 
(Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets) 
 Mean group (MG) 
(1) 
Pooled Mean Group (PMG) 
(2) 
Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) 
(3) 
Long Run    
Elapse 
 
0.037*** 
(2.98) 
0.027** 
(2.06) 
0.038** 
(2.28)  
Log(Per capita SGDP) -0.383*** 
(4.8) 
-0.37*** 
(9.27) 
-0.369*** 
(7.6) 
Log(Share of agricultural 
output in SGDP) 
-0.687** 
(2.3) 
-0.686*** 
(4.43) 
-0.75*** 
(3.94) 
Log(Fiscal space) 0.431** 
(1.98) 
0.792*** 
(8.17) 
0.479*** 
(3.99) 
Political alignment  0.079 
(0.074) 
0.058 
(1.01) 
0.106 
(1.58) 
Congress party 0.005 
(0.06) 
-0.042 
(0.71) 
-0.116 
(1.49) 
Regional party 0.218* 
(1.83) 
0.112* 
(1.65) 
0.019 
(0.21) 
Short Run    
Error correction Term -0.598*** 
(9.6) 
-0.430*** 
(6.35) 
-0.422*** 
(14.04) 
D(Log(Per capita SGDP)) 0.045 
(0.23) 
0.029 
(0.23) 
0.128 
(0.9) 
D(Log(Share of agricultural 
output in SGDP)) 
0.053 
(0.3) 
0.098 
(1.01) 
0.043 
(0.31) 
D(Log(Fiscal space)) -0.252 
(1.58) 
-0.217* 
(1.84) 
-0.156*** 
(2.88) 
Constant 1.33* 
(1.68) 
0.423*** 
(4.47) 
1.01* 
(1.94) 
No. Observations 722 722 722 
Chosen model MG   
Note: (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The upper panel shows long-run effects, 
whereas the lower panel reports both short-run effects and the speed of adjustment. A Hausman test is used 
to select the appropriate model. 
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Table 4 
Effect of election timing on noninterest total expenditure and fiscal surplus as 
percentage of SGDP 
(Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets) 
 Non interest total spending/SGDP 
(1) 
Fiscal surplus/SGDP 
(2)  
Long Run   
Elapse 
 
0.005 
(0.45) 
0.054 
(1.56) 
Log(Per capita SGDP) 0.108** 
(2.07) 
-0.708*** 
(6.02) 
Log(Share of agricultural 
output in SGDP) 
-0.268 
(1.40) 
1.587*** 
(3.21) 
Log(Fiscal space) 0.994*** 
(4.09) 
2.27*** 
(9.5) 
Political alignment  0.011 
(0.25) 
-0.08 
(0.56) 
Congress party -0.094* 
(1.68) 
0.332* 
(1.77) 
Regional party -0.075 
(1.12) 
0.113 
(0.57) 
Short Run   
Error correction Term -0.356*** 
(7.01) 
-0.403*** 
(9.69) 
D(Log(Per capita SGDP)) -0.829*** 
(10.12) 
0.929** 
(2.04) 
D(Log(Share of agricultural 
output in SGDP)) 
-0.023 
(0.26) 
-0.134 
(0.21) 
D(Log(Fiscal space)) -0.36*** 
(5.07) 
2.03*** 
(5.9) 
Constant -0.284 
(0.48) 
-4.697*** 
(9.11) 
No. Observations 722 722 
Chosen model MG PMG 
Note: (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The upper panel shows long-run effects, the 
lower panel reports both short-run effects and the speed of adjustment. A Hausman test was used to select 
the appropriate ARDL model. 
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Table 5 
Elapse only in terms with scheduled elections and their effect on fiscal outcomes 
 (Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets) 
 Log(Capital 
expenditure/Total 
noninterest 
expenditure) 
(1) 
Log(Capital 
expenditure/Noninterest 
current expenditure) 
 
(2) 
Log(Non interest  
total 
spending/SGDP) 
 
(3) 
State Fiscal 
surplus/SGDP 
 
 
(4) 
Long Run     
Elapse in Scheduled 
elections 
0.033*** 
(3.17) 
0.044*** 
(3.35) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.037 
(1.08) 
Log(Per capita SGDP) -0.285*** 
(4.56) 
-0.379*** 
(4.80) 
0.107** 
(2.04) 
-0.708*** 
(6.00) 
Log(Share of 
agricultural output in 
SGDP) 
-0.47* 
(1.92) 
-0.643** 
(2.19) 
-0.259 
(1.37) 
1.575*** 
(3.18) 
Log(Fiscal space) 0.372** 
(2.08) 
0.43** 
(1.98) 
0.984*** 
(4.03) 
2.27*** 
(9.50) 
Political alignment  0.077 
(1.17) 
0.076 
(1.01) 
0.005 
(0.11) 
-0.078 
(0.55) 
Congress party -0.006 
(0.09) 
-0.008 
(0.01) 
-0.086* 
(1.72) 
0.329* 
(1.75) 
Regional party 0.193* 
(1.88) 
0.226* 
(1.93) 
-0.08 
(1.31) 
0.104 
(0.52) 
Short Run     
Error correction Term -0.618*** 
(9.75) 
-0.606*** 
(9.84) 
-0.357*** 
(7.15) 
-0.403*** 
(9.76) 
D(Log(Per capita 
SGDP)) 
-0.019 
(0.13) 
-0.046 
(0.23) 
-0.826*** 
(10) 
0.931** 
(2.05) 
D(Log(Share of 
agricultural output in 
SGDP)) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.044 
(0.24) 
-0.019 
(0.21) 
-0.126 
(0.2) 
D(Log(Fiscal space)) -0.17 
(1.38) 
-0.232 
(1.48) 
-0.367*** 
(5.26) 
2.031*** 
(5.93) 
Constant 3.303*** 
(4.84) 
1.29* 
(1.67) 
-0.283 
(0.47) 
-4.675*** 
(9.15) 
No. Observations 722 722 722 722 
Chosen model MG MG MG PMG 
Note: (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The upper panel shows the long-run effects, 
whereas the lower panel reports both short-run effects and the speed of adjustment. A Hausman test was 
used to select the more appropriate ARDL model. 
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Table 6 
ARDL models using an alternative measure of capital spending 
 (Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets) 
 Log(Capital 
outlays/Total 
noninterest 
expenditure) 
(1) 
Log(Capital 
outlays/Noninterest 
current expenditure) 
 
(2) 
Log(Capital 
expenditure/Total 
noninterest 
expenditure) 
(3) 
Long Run    
Elapse 
 
0.030** 
(2.03) 
0.038** 
(2.38) 
 
Schedule Election Year 
(+1) 
  0.088* 
(1.94) 
Log(Per capita SGDP) -0.295*** 
(6.12) 
-0.317*** 
(3.6) 
-0.298*** 
(4.92) 
Log(Share of agricultural 
output in SGDP) 
-0.950*** 
(4.75) 
-0.823** 
(2.44) 
-0.487** 
(2.01) 
Log(Fiscal space) 0.609*** 
(6.45) 
0.354 
(1.33) 
-0.235** 
(2.01) 
Political alignment  0.085 
(1.35) 
0.025 
(0.27) 
0.064 
(0.90) 
Congress party -0.098 
(1.28) 
0.160 
(1.27) 
-0.036 
(0.48) 
Regional party 0.039 
(0.49) 
0.348** 
(2.18) 
0.110 
(1.11) 
Short Run    
Error correction Term -0.408*** 
(6.35) 
-0.578*** 
(8.94) 
-0.599*** 
(9.46) 
D(Log(Per capita SGDP)) 0.086 
(0.43) 
-0.086 
(0.3) 
0.011 
(0.06) 
D(Log(Share of 
agricultural output in 
SGDP)) 
-0.185 
(1.02) 
-0.039 
(0.11) 
-0.069 
(0.30) 
D(Log(Fiscal space)) -0.353** 
(2.25) 
-0.415*** 
(2.72) 
0.106 
(1.29) 
Constant 2.451*** 
(6.06) 
1.754 
(1.59) 
4.71*** 
(4.33) 
No. Observations 722 722 722 
Chosen model PMG MG MG 
Note: (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The first panel shows the long-run 
effects, whereas the second panel reports both short-run effects and the speed of adjustment. A 
Hausman test was used to select the more appropriate ARDL model. 
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